

S E C R E T

AH. TS 840137  
NIC 03508-84

3 JUL 1984 ER 84-264811

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of, Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Soviet/East European Division

25X1

SUBJECT: US/Soviet Tensions

REFERENCE: Memorandum from the NIO for Warning on Above  
Subject, 15 June 1984  
Memorandum from DCY on Above Subject, 19 June 1984

1. At your request, following are some SE Division comments on the list of Soviet actions, seemingly related to US-Soviet tensions, circulated by the NIO for Warning.

2. The list represents essentially the first step in the analytic process, the gathering and arrangement of data in order to calculate the nature of the analytic problem that exists and to decide how to treat the problem in terms of further collection, monitoring, and analysis. Even as a collection of data, the list must be regarded as very preliminary, since there is no claim that it is comprehensive, the relevancy of all its items has not been established, and contradictory data are not included. Obviously, at this point, the events listed appear outside of any context and without comparison to an historical record. We tend to agree, nevertheless, with the basic conclusion of the list's compilers that its data suggest the usefulness of further study, including the monitoring and periodic review of Soviet actions.

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3. What troubles us is that the way this very preliminary list of data has been circulated has seemed to imply that it bears some message or points to some conclusion beyond that stated above. The introduction to the summary of events characterizes them in various ways, suggesting that they relate to actions the Soviets could orchestrate to create political embarrassment for the US and, also, that they may all be prudent precautions in a period of anxiety and uncertainty. At the same time, the introduction finds sufficient consistency in these Soviet measures to suggest they result from central decisionmaking, which presumably has some ultimate aim in mind. In transmitting the list to policy makers, the data are labeled a stunning array of indicators of Soviet aggressiveness, and it is implied that the data point either to preparation for a crisis or an attempt to embarrass or politically influence events in the US. At this point, we would hesitate to support any of these conclusions.

4. Clearly, before an understanding of the meaning of these events can be achieved, the basic analytic tasks that follow the collection of data must be performed, including the still early steps of establishing criteria for data selection and defining hypotheses against which to examine the data. This is to say that the process undertaken to produce SNIE 11-10-84, a study in which we find much merit, will have to be repeated as this problem continues to be monitored and re-examined.

5. For what they are worth, we offer some thoughts on issues that should be kept in mind as we all contemplate Soviet actions in the present period.

6. First, in terms of context and Soviet motivation, it is useful to recognize how radically the basic conditions of Soviet domestic and foreign affairs have changed since the 1970's. Then the USSR had a stable leadership and its relations with the West were characterized by the conditions of detente. Now the Soviet leadership is in flux and relations with the West are dominated by an atmosphere of hostility between the US and USSR.

7. Second, concurrent with the above changes, developments in almost every sphere (US-Soviet strategic relationship, relations with Western Europe, the effect of Poland on the bloc, Afghanistan, the state of the domestic economy) have been of a nature likely to undermine Soviet self-confidence and to contribute to a sense of vulnerability. This can affect foreign policy motivations and the mix of risk-taking and caution exercised in the conduct of foreign policy.

S E C R E T

## S E C R E T

8. Third, the SNIE examined several hypotheses to explain Soviet behavior, and the drafters of this list of Soviet actions suggest some others, all of which need to be kept under continual consideration. An explanation for some elements of Soviet behavior that might be given more attention is the possibility that major Soviet institutions are enjoying more leeway in activity and in policy influence in the absence of strong, cohesive political leadership at the top. This is not to make the argument sometimes heard that the military, for example, is running the show or that various institutions are out of political control. Rather, it is to say that these institutions may find it easier at present to take certain measures or to get approval for policies they favor because of the relatively reduced authority exercised by the top leader, and that this may be the origin of some developments we see.

9. Fourth, the search for a single or dominant explanation for the broad range of Soviet behavior--an aim, such as embarrassing the US, and a controlling authority directing and coordinating various actions to this end--is a legitimate one. We suspect, however, that in reality multiple causes affecting events individually and separately will be found to be the best explanation for Soviet behavior across the board. We would look for a certain coherence in Soviet actions and for the reason for this coherence in the dynamic of interaction of separate causes affecting the direction of events in various fields. Thus, in the context of tension with the US and leadership flux in Moscow, one action may be taken for propaganda purposes, another to intimidate, another for defensive reasons, and another because it is in a bureaucracy's self-interest, but many of these actions may complement each other in giving a similar direction to policy in many spheres and may reinforce each other, generating further movement of overall policy in that same direction. The interaction and mutual reinforcement of different conditions and motives, and how this process may drive Soviet policy overall in a general direction and with what ultimate consequences, is a matter that deserves further inquiry.

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## EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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22				
SUSPENSE			2 July	

Remarks

Recommendation to DCI please with response to McFarlane for his signature.

D/ Executive Secretary  
27 June 84

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ER: SNIE will be prepared. DCF will mention to McFarlane at his 27 June mtg with McFarlane. No further response needed

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
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

June 26, 1984

  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: US/Soviet Tension (S)

The President has received your memorandum of June 19 listing possible indicators of unusual Soviet activity. This matter merits further attention, and your decision to produce biweekly reports to monitor the situation and disseminate new information is welcome. (TS)

As you also noted, there is a need to pull together available data in a systematic way and to analyze its importance and meaning. Last month's SNIE on Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities listed some of the more important developments in Soviet military and political behavior and offered a series of hypotheses about Soviet motivations and intentions. It would be helpful if you would integrate pieces of evidence to develop further these and any other relevant hypotheses which may help us anticipate potential Soviet political or military challenges during the coming six months. Specifically, detailed discussion of the utility to the Soviets of interfering in various geographic trouble spots, and of indicators that they might plan or have the opportunity to do so, would be helpful, with prioritization of potential problems in order of likelihood. Competitive analysis would be appreciated. (TS)

The analysis could integrate our knowledge of Soviet strategic theory and military capabilities, including the possibility of Soviet concealment or deceptive practices. To focus collection and analysis and anticipate the clarity of indicators which likely would be available, it would be useful to draw upon past precedents -- e.g., the Cuban and Berlin crises and the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan -- to determine those indicators we spotted before these events, those which were available but known only in retrospect and diversionary techniques used by the Soviets to reduce warning time. (TS)

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CIA TS 840137

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Given the urgency of this issue, we would appreciate your developing this Special National Intelligence Estimate as soon as possible. (S)



Robert C. McFarlane

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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
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SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

Executive Secretary

6/19/84

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT



ER 84-2648/1

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

19 JUN 1984

AH.NIC 03508-8

NIO / WARN, WA

Dave

Executive Registry

84- 2648/1

U. S. / Soviet Tension

Your paper  
on the Saw  
actions of late  
is very fascinating  
and in fact frightening  
when put all  
together —  
Good work

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C-140

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/04 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001000010034-6  
Both of these relate to N10/Warning Paper on Soviet/ U. S. Tensions -  
now next step is to launch the biweekly strategic warning report -  
Mr. Casey says to see what is produced and maintained at a high level  
of quality on which DCI would be glad to chip in in any way he can.

STAT

Action completed 5 July  
First bi-weekly issued 6 Aug

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/04 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001000010034-6

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

ER 84-2648

CR - NIC 03508-84

19 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: US/Soviet Tension

1. I attach here a rather stunning array of indicators of an increasing aggressiveness in Soviet policy and activities. These include developments in the media, civil defense sector, security operations, political harassment, logistical steps, the economy, intelligence preparations and political activity.

2. The depth and breadth of these activities demand increased and continual review to assess whether they are in preparation for a crisis or merely to embarrass or politically influence events in the United States.

3. In the light of the increasing number and accelerating tempo of developments of this type, we will shortly begin to produce a biweekly strategic warning report which will monitor and assess the implications of these incidents which we report on as they occur, but have not, thus far, pulled together in any systematic way.

151

William J. Casey

Distribution by ER/19 Jun 84 w/Atch

Orig - Each Addressee

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### U.S./Soviet Tension

The recent SNIE-11-10-84 JX examined a range of Soviet political and military activities that are influenced by Soviet perceptions or a mounting challenge from U.S. foreign and defense policy. Each Soviet action could be sufficiently explained by its own military or political purpose consistent with developing military readiness or a "get-tough" policy to counter the current U.S. stance.

This summary will consider some longer term events that may cause some reflections about the kinds of actions the Soviets could orchestrate that would create a political embarrassment for the U.S. in the wake of deployment of INF in Europe. We believe the Soviets have concluded that the danger of war is greater than it was before the INF decision; that Soviet vulnerability is greater and will grow with additional INF emplacements and that the reduced warning time inherent in Pershing II has lowered Soviet confidence in their ability to warn of sudden attack. These perceptions, perhaps driven by a building U.S. defense budget, new initiatives in continental defense, improvements in force readiness, and a potentially massive space defense program may be propelling the USSR to take national readiness measures at a deliberate pace. There is a certain consistency and coherence in the symptoms of measures being taken that suggests central decisionmaking. Some of "civilian to wartime-type" of activity suggest a broad-based plan. These activities may all be prudent precautions in a period of anxiety and uncertainty on the part of the Soviets. Some of the measures we perceive follow.

#### A. Media

Soviet media have portrayed the environment as dangerous to the domestic populace. The risks involved have been recognized in that in December 1983, the Soviets carefully modulated the tone to allay what appeared to be brewing hysteria. A message has been that the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations is comparable to those between Nazi Germany and the USSR prior to WWII and that the Soviets will not be surprised again.

#### B. Civil Defense

It is difficult to document an increase in attention to this area, but the civil defense exercise at Omsk in March in which 800 persons walked 50 km was without precedent in our knowledge. Civil defense remains an area of perennially high interest in the Soviet domestic media. ✓

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### C. Security Procedures

--Leningrad has become a closed city to Western attaches. U.S., UK, French and Canadian attaches in Moscow have been denied travel to Leningrad on numerous occasions in 1984. The Soviets prevented attache travel by international visas from Helsinki to Leningrad to Helsinki in May 1984. Their willingness to ignore the international portion of that trip to prevent attache travel indicates high-interest activity in the Leningrad area and/or a critical time-frame.

--In May 1984, valid visas for 58 Americans planning tour travel of USSR were cancelled. Apparently, the decision was made by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. The trip included a flight from Naples to Leningrad and it appears that those with defense security clearances were denied visas.

--[redacted] there has been an important change in the "political atmospherics" [redacted] in particular, has become intense. The publication of an article in Red Star, 25 May 1984, against U.S. Naval Attaches suggests the Soviet campaign will be generalized and expanded.

[redacted] a Hungarian Ambassador at a non-European Embassy has forbidden all of his staff to have contact with Western officials.

--The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly issued a directive in late 1983 that officials abroad should terminate contact with U.S. British and West German officials.

[redacted] restrictions severely hamper the right to free and unimpeded transit guaranteed under the Huebner-Malinin agreements and similar agreements.

--In June 1984, for the first time since 1972 a portion of the City of Potsdam was included in a TRA.

--The Soviets continue to declare multiple TRA's in addition to the PRAs.

--There have also been other travel restrictions. In Poland, there has been a perceptible increase in surveillance of attaches in the southwest corner of the country (Wroclaw, Zegnia, Swietoszow, Zagan), but not elsewhere. There has also been an increase in instances of surveillance since late 1983.

--Three recent incidents occurred in Poland where army and security personnel detained NATO attaches and then forced them to drive through a military restricted area for posed photography. In each case, the attaches were detained on public roads in an apparently well-planned effort at intimidation.

--In the Soviet Union, Pravda articles in June called for greater vigilance of Westerners and Soviet dissenters. [redacted] harassment of Western reporters has increased. Soviet border guards are conducting more intensive searches of Western visitors.

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[redacted] there has been a steady increase in civilian companies apparently enforcing discipline and improving "piece rates." The greater presence of guards and security people at defense-related production plants [redacted]

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#### D. Political Harrassment

--On 20 February 1984, the Soviets imposed new restrictions on Allied flights in the three corridors linking Berling to West Germany. Basically, altitude restrictions apply to the entire length of the corridors, rather than the central portions as had been the practice. New traffic-identification demands have also been made and met by the Allies.

--On 22 March 1984, an East German military vehicle rammed a French MLM vehicle killing the driver and injuring two others.

--On 18 April 1984, the Soviets briefly detained an eight-vehicle French Army convoy at an Autobahn Checkpoint.

--On 2 May 1984, a U.S. military train bound for Berlin was delayed by East German railroad officials.

--On 16 May, East Germans refused to pull a French military train to Berlin until the French protested to the Soviet Embassy.

[redacted]  
[redacted] the Soviet leadership wants to remind the West of the fragility of free air access to Berlin. East Germans look to take advantage of the Soviet behavior.

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--On 8 June, the U.S. Consul General in Leningrad was called to a Soviet review of the assault on Ronald Harms on 17 April accusing the press coverage of being an exaggerated claim in a U.S. Government anti-Soviet campaign.

#### E. Logistics

The 1983 study of Soviet railroads concluded that the industry must improve its performance. The need for attention to the railroads is beyond question, but the new campaign which features early completion of the BALCOM line adds a sense of urgency to transportation improvements.

#### F. The Economy

--There has been a significant reduction in production of commercial aircraft in favor of military transport production since about June 1982. [redacted] studies show commercial aircraft production down 14 percent in 1983. Not only are traditional Soviet aircraft customers not adding new aircraft of Soviet make to their fleets, but the Soviets are buying back civil aircraft from Eastern European airlines. The increased allocation of resources for military aircraft production is supported by [redacted]

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--Other changes under way in selected segments of the economy point toward shifts to military needs. The termination of military support to the harvest, by directive of March 1984, may say that the success of the harvest is less important than the maintenance of military capabilities at high readiness. Such a decision is consistent with a leadership perception that danger is present, but inconsistent with the alleged priority of the food program and stated Soviet concerns about internal security problems owing to shortages and consumer dissatisfaction.

--In December 1983, [redacted] production of tank chassis at the Chelyabinsk tractor plant for the first time since World War II. A second plant has also converted from tractors to tanks. Since July 1983, the first new nuclear weapons storage facility in a decade is under construction at Komsomolsk. Throughout the USSR, floorspace for ammunition

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and explosives plants has been expanding since about 1980 after a decline of several years' duration. In April, the East German ammunition plant at Luebben increased to full three-shift 24-hour production and has more than doubled its output. These developments cross several sectors of national economic life and indicate that decisions are being made consistently across economic sectors.

--The increases in production are complemented by developments in the factors of production, especially labor and management. These have been subjected to one of the most strenuous and long-lasting campaigns to improve performance and expand output ever undertaken by Soviet authorities.

--At the same time, there has been a cutback in Soviet support for the East European economies, Soviet demands for better quality products from them, and higher prices for Soviet exports. These trends became evident in the fall of 1980 during the Polish crisis and have persisted. Although there are many sound reasons for the trends, they complement those already mentioned.

--Rationing of key products may be affecting commercial interests. State-owned trucking companies in Czechoslovakia are reported operating far below capacity due to insufficient fuel rations allotted as of 1 January 1984.

--In Poland, Jaruzelski apparently has formally agreed with the USSR to give up civilian production capacity to supply the Soviets with more military hardware.

--In a Magdeburg, East Germany metal processing cooperative, there are resource allocation shortages and increased target plans for 1984. While the imbalance could be blamed on poor management, the situation was exacerbated by a new bank law that prevents using state financial reserves since 1 January 1984.

#### G. Military Activity

--[redacted] rail movement in support of Soviet troop rotation, although with a slightly reduced volume, was continuing. (This extension also occurred during the last two rotation periods.) Extending the rotation seems to conflict with other Soviet efforts to minimize the impact of rotation, and the flow of personnel over three months would seem to disrupt programmed training.

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--Other irregularities have occurred in the troop rotation. Past railroad rotation activity was marked by a regularity of arrival and departure times. This rotation has been scheduled inconsistently. Additionally, there have been a number of anomalies. Railroad cars have arrived at Weimar, East Germany with approximately 75 troops but departed with only 35. [REDACTED]

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--The Soviets may, for the first time during peacetime, be keeping a portion of their nuclear forces in Eastern Europe on quick-alert status, using sites for their SS-22 brigades in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. ✓

--On 23, 24, 25 and 26 March 1984, approximately 3,650 Soviet troops arrived in Hungary.

--In June 1984, [REDACTED] during the past 6-12 months additional SPETNAZ troops have arrived in Hungary. [REDACTED] increase of SPETNAZ forces in Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well as an ongoing "aggressive indoctrination" of Warsaw Pact forces. ✓

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[REDACTED] is concerned about stockpiling of material and an increase in Soviet troop strength in Hungary. 25X1

--In Hungary, a recall of an undetermined number of reservists was under way in May 1984. ✓

--In the fall of 1983, the length of service for Czechoslovakian Army draftees with missile/rocket specialities was [REDACTED] extended from two to three years. The length of service for air defense draftees with missile training was similarly extended. ✓ 25X1

--In Poland, the length of required military service for new reserve officers was to be increased from 12 to 18 months effective in 1984.

[REDACTED] a mobilization exercise involving armed forces and territorial forces as well as civil defense elements is to occur in June in Czechoslovakia. 25X1

[redacted] [redacted] since 1983, men up to 35 years old have been drafted without consideration of family difficulties or their profession. ✓

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--The Soviets have pressed for stationing additional troops in Poland. [redacted] additional Soviet air elements are already sanctioned by the Poles.

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#### H. Intelligence Activity

[redacted] the extraordinary intelligence directives that have been issued. The thrust of these directives is to increase the authority of the intelligence agencies at the expense of career diplomats and to focus intelligence collection on survivability of networks and on warning. [redacted]

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#### I. Political Activity

--In external relations, Soviet activity has been intense. A series of relatively low-level harrassments concerning Berlin air corridors and ground access to Berlin fall into this category and have the potential to become more escalatory. The Soviets have recently cancelled a long-standing commercial accord with the U.S. The level of official harrassment of Western attaches is high throughout the Warsaw Pact, even including a shooting incident in Bulgaria. New travel restrictions have been placed on Western diplomats in the USSR.

--A message of dissatisfaction in U.S.-Soviet relations is clear, but more than the message the Soviets may actually be paying costs--surrendering commercial contacts and their own freedom of access. Activity resembles a calculated and careful withdrawal on multiple fronts; a limitation of exposure and vulnerability.

#### J. Military Behavior

The behavior of the armed forces is perhaps the most disturbing. From the operational deployment of submarines to the termination of harvest support to the delayed troop rotation there is a central theme of not being strategically vulnerable, even if it means taking some risks. It is important to distinguish in this category those acts which are political blustering and those which may be, but also carry large costs. The point of blustering is to do something that makes the opponent pay

high costs while the blusterer pays none or little. The military behaviors we have observed involve high military costs in terms of vulnerability of resources for the sake of improved national military power, or enhanced readiness at the price of consumer discontent, or enhanced readiness at the price of troop dissatisfaction. None of these are trivial costs, adding thereby a dimension of genuineness to the Soviet expressions of concern that is often not reflected in intelligence issuances.

CONTROL NO. \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF: \_\_\_\_\_

PRIOR PAPERS ON THIS SUBJECT: NO YES

PRIOR CORRES SENT TO: \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

*This is an advance (weekend)  
copy. orig package arrives  
monday.  
To DCI 15 June 84*

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE NO: \_\_\_\_\_

~~P-2050~~ CROSS REF: \_\_\_\_\_

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Soviet - U.S. Tensions

FROM:

David Y. McManis  
NIO/Warning

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

15 June 1984

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

6/15/84

HOM

2.

3. Chairman, National Intelligence Council

8

4. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

dyp

5. Director of Central Intelligence

✓

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THIS IS A FAIRLY  
STUNNING PIECE OF  
WORK.

HOM

3 → 4, 5: I agree with Herb. In fact, I believe you should send this to PDB principals with a note along the lines of Dave's memo to you. I would end it by saying, in light of these developments, we will begin producing a bi-weekly Strategic Warning Report for them which will focus on just such developments.

Rg.

(P.S. Now, this is a real - and unique - contribution by NIO for warning.)

~~SECRET~~

NIC-03508-84

15 JUN 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council *S*  
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council *HGM*

FROM: David Y. McManis  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT: Soviet/U.S. Tension

1. The recent SNIE-11-10-84 JX, Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities, 18 May 1984, examined a range of Soviet political and military activities that are influenced by Soviet perceptions of a mounting challenge from U.S. foreign and defense policy. Each Soviet action could be sufficiently explained by its own military or political purpose consistent with developing military readiness or a "get-tough" policy to counter the current U.S. stance.

2. We do not basically disagree with the conclusions. However, in the face of increasing indicators in the media, civil defense sector, security operations, political harrassment, logistical area, the economy, military activity, intelligence operations, and political activity we believe that a new and continuing review is required.

3. Our concern stems from the number of discr~~et~~<sup>etc</sup> and individually trivial events that our rather superficial review has uncovered. In fact, we believe that the several reports summarized in the attachment would be just the tip of the iceberg if a systematic review were accomplished.

4. We believe warning will come from the broad spectrum of activity. The depth and breadth of this activity demands careful and continuing review by the Intelligence Community to decide whether we are seeing preparations for a crisis manipulated by the USSR for the purpose of embarrassing or politically defeating the U.S. or this administration.

*David Y. McManis*  
David Y. McManis

Attachment

WARNING NOTICE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
OR METHODS INVOLVED

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SUBJECT: Soviet/U.S. Tensions

Distribution:

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O/DCI/NIC  (15 June 1984)

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